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Abstract
Many real-world applications can be described as large-scale games of imperfect
information. To deal with these challenging domains, prior work has focused on
computing Nash equilibria in a handcrafted abstraction of the domain. In this
paper we introduce the first scalable end-to-end approach to learning approximate
Nash equilibria without prior domain knowledge. Our method combines fictitious
self-play with deep reinforcement learning. When applied to Leduc poker, Neural
Fictitious Self-Play (NFSP) approached a Nash equilibrium, whereas common
reinforcement learning methods diverged. In Limit Texas Hold’em, a poker game
of real-world scale, NFSP learnt a strategy that approached the performance of
state-of-the-art, superhuman algorithms based on significant domain expertise.
1 Introduction
Games have a tradition of encouraging advances in artificial intelligence and machine learning
(Samuel, 1959; Tesauro, 1995; Campbell et al., 2002; Gelly et al., 2012; Bowling et al., 2015). A
game is a domain of conflict or cooperation between several entities (Myerson, 1991). One motivation
for studying recreational games is to develop algorithms that will scale to more complex, real-world
games such as airport and network security, financial and energy trading, traffic control and routing
(Lambert III et al., 2005; Nevmyvaka et al., 2006; Bazzan, 2009; Tambe, 2011; Urieli and Stone,
2014). Most of these real-world games involve decision making with imperfect information and
high-dimensional information state spaces. An optimal (and in principle learnable) solution to
these games would be a Nash equilibrium, i.e. a strategy from which no agent would choose to
deviate. While many machine learning methods have achieved near-optimal solutions to classical,
perfect-information games, these methods fail to converge in imperfect-information games. On the
other hand, many game-theoretic approaches for finding Nash equilibria lack the ability to learn
abstract patterns and use them to generalise to novel situations. This results in limited scalability to
large games, unless the domain is abstracted to a manageable size using human expert knowledge,
heuristics or modelling. However, acquiring human expertise often requires expensive resources and
time. In addition, humans can be easily fooled into irrational decisions or assumptions (Selten, 1990).
This motivates algorithms that learn useful strategies end-to-end.
Fictitious play (Brown, 1951) is a popular method for learning Nash equilibria in normal-form
(single-step) games. Fictitious players choose best responses (i.e. optimal counter-strategies) to
their opponents’ average behaviour. Fictitious Self-Play (FSP) (Heinrich et al., 2015) extends this
method to extensive-form (multi-step) games. In this paper we introduce NFSP, a deep reinforcement
learning method for learning approximate Nash equilibria of imperfect-information games. NFSP
combines FSP with neural network function approximation. An NFSP agent consists of two neural
networks. The first network is trained by reinforcement learning from memorized experience of play
against fellow agents. This network learns an approximate best response to the historical behaviour
of other agents. The second network is trained by supervised learning from memorized experience of
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the agent’s own behaviour. This network learns a model that averages over the agent’s own historical
strategies. The agent behaves according to a mixture of its average strategy and best response strategy.
We empirically evaluate our method in two-player zero-sum computer poker games. In this domain,
current game-theoretic approaches use heuristics of card strength to abstract the game to a tractable
size (Johanson et al., 2013). Our approach does not rely on engineering such abstractions or any
other prior domain knowledge. NFSP agents leverage deep reinforcement learning to learn directly
from their experience of interacting with other agents in the game. When applied to Leduc poker,
NFSP approached a Nash equilibrium, whereas common reinforcement learning methods diverged.
We also applied NFSP to Limit Texas Hold’em (LHE), learning directly from the raw inputs. NFSP
learnt a strategy that approached the performance of state-of-the-art, superhuman methods based on
handcrafted abstractions.
2 Background
In this section we provide a brief overview of reinforcement learning, extensive-form games and
fictitious self-play. For a more detailed exposition we refer the reader to (Sutton and Barto, 1998),
(Myerson, 1991), (Fudenberg, 1998) and (Heinrich et al., 2015).
2.1 Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998) agents typically learn to maximize their expected
future rewards from interaction with an environment. The environment is usually modelled as a
Markov decision process (MDP). An agent behaves according to a policy that specifies a distribution
over available actions at each state of the MDP. The agent’s goal is to improve its policy in order to
maximize its gain, Gt =
∑T
i=tRi+1, which is a random variable of the agent’s cumulative future
rewards starting from time t.
Many reinforcement learning algorithms learn from sequential experience in the form of transition
tuples, (st, at, rt+1, st+1), where st is the state at time t, at is the action chosen in that state, rt+1 the
reward received thereafter and st+1 the next state that the agent transitioned to. A common objective
is to learn the action-value function, Q(s, a) = Epi [Gt |St = s,At = a], defined as the expected
gain of taking action a in state s and following policy pi thereafter. An agent is learning on-policy if
it learns about the policy that it is currently following. In the off-policy setting an agent learns from
experience of another agent or another policy, e.g. a previous policy.
Q-learning (Watkins and Dayan, 1992) is a popular off-policy reinforcement learning method. It
learns about the greedy policy, which at each state takes the action of the highest estimated value.
Storing and replaying past experience with off-policy reinforcement learning from the respective
transitions is known as experience replay (Lin, 1992). Fitted Q Iteration (FQI) (Ernst et al., 2005)
is a batch reinforcement learning method that replays experience with Q-learning. Neural Fitted Q
Iteration (NFQ) (Riedmiller, 2005) and Deep Q Network (DQN) (Mnih et al., 2015) are extensions of
FQI that use neural network function approximation with batch and online updates respectively.
2.2 Extensive-Form Games
Extensive-form games are a model of sequential interaction involving multiple players. Assuming
rationality, each player’s goal is to maximize his payoff in the game. In imperfect-information games,
each player only observes his respective information states, e.g. in a poker game a player only
knows his own private cards but not those of other players. Each player chooses a behavioural
strategy that maps information states to probability distributions over available actions. We assume
games with perfect recall, i.e. each player’s current information state sit implies knowledge of
the sequence of his information states and actions, si1, a
i
1, s
i
2, a
i
2, ..., s
i
t, that led to this information
state. The realization-probability (Von Stengel, 1996), xpii(sit) =
∏t−1
k=1 pi
i(sik, a
i
k), determines the
probability that player i’s behavioural strategy, pii, contributes to realizing his information state sit.
A strategy profile pi = (pi1, ... , pin) is a collection of strategies for all players. pi−i refers to all
strategies in pi except pii. Given a fixed strategy profile pi−i, any strategy of player i that achieves
optimal payoff performance against pi−i is a best response. An approximate or -best response is
suboptimal by no more than . A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile such that each player’s
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strategy in this profile is a best response to the other strategies. Similarly, an approximate or -Nash
equilibrium is a profile of -best responses. In a Nash equilibrium no player can gain by deviating
from his strategy. Therefore, a Nash equilibrium can be regarded as a fixed point of rational self-play
learning. In fact, Nash equilibria are the only strategy profiles that rational agents can hope to
converge on in self-play (Bowling and Veloso, 2001).
2.3 Fictitious Self-Play
Fictitious play (Brown, 1951) is a game-theoretic model of learning from self-play. Fictitious players
choose best responses to their opponents’ average behaviour. The average strategies of fictitious
players converge to Nash equilibria in certain classes of games, e.g. two-player zero-sum and many-
player potential games (Robinson, 1951; Monderer and Shapley, 1996). Leslie and Collins (2006)
introduced generalised weakened fictitious play. It has similar convergence guarantees as common
fictitious play, but allows for approximate best responses and perturbed average strategy updates,
making it particularly suitable for machine learning.
Fictitious play is commonly defined in normal form, which is exponentially less efficient for extensive-
form games. Heinrich et al. (2015) introduce Full-Width Extensive-Form Fictitious Play (XFP)
that enables fictitious players to update their strategies in behavioural, extensive form, resulting in
linear time and space complexity. A key insight is that for a convex combination of normal-form
strategies, σˆ = λ1pˆi1 + λ2pˆi2, we can achieve a realization-equivalent behavioural strategy σ, by
setting it to be proportional to the respective convex combination of realization-probabilities,
σ(s, a) ∝ λ1xpi1(s)pi1(s, a) + λ2xpi2(s)pi2(s, a) ∀s, a, (1)
where λ1xpi1(s) + λ2xpi2(s) is the normalizing constant for the strategy at information state s. In
addition to defining a full-width average strategy update of fictitious players in behavioural strategies,
equation (1) prescribes a way to sample data sets of such convex combinations of strategies. Heinrich
et al. (2015) introduce Fictitious Self-Play (FSP), a sample- and machine learning-based class of
algorithms that approximate XFP. FSP replaces the best response computation and the average
strategy updates with reinforcement and supervised learning respectively. In particular, FSP agents
generate datasets of their experience in self-play. Each agent stores its experienced transition tuples,
(st, at, rt+1, st+1), in a memory,MRL, designated for reinforcement learning. Experience of the
agent’s own behaviour, (st, at), is stored in a separate memory,MSL, designated for supervised
learning. Self-play sampling is set up in a way that an agent’s reinforcement learning memory
approximates data of an MDP defined by the other players’ average strategy profile. Thus, an
approximate solution of the MDP by reinforcement learning yields an approximate best response.
Similarly, an agent’s supervised learning memory approximates data of the agent’s own average
strategy, which can be learned by supervised classification.
3 Neural Fictitious Self-Play
NFSP combines FSP with neural network function approximation. In algorithm 1 all players of
the game are controlled by separate NFSP agents that learn from simultaneous play against each
other, i.e. self-play. An NFSP agent interacts with its fellow agents and memorizes its experience
of game transitions and its own best response behaviour in two memories,MRL andMSL. NFSP
treats these memories as two distinct datasets suitable for deep reinforcement learning and supervised
classification respectively. The agent trains a neural network, Q(s, a | θQ), to predict action values
from data inMRL using off-policy reinforcement learning. The resulting network defines the agent’s
approximate best response strategy, β = -greedy(Q), which selects a random action with probability
 and otherwise chooses the action that maximizes the predicted action values. The agent trains a
separate neural network, Π(s, a | θΠ), to imitate its own past best response behaviour using supervised
classification on the data inMSL. This network maps states to action probabilities and defines the
agent’s average strategy, pi = Π. During play, the agent chooses its actions from a mixture of its two
strategies, β and pi. NFSP also makes use of two technical innovations in order to ensure the stability
of the resulting algorithm as well as enable simultaneous self-play learning. First, it uses reservoir
sampling (Vitter, 1985) to avoid windowing artifacts due to sampling from a finite memory. Second,
it uses anticipatory dynamics (Shamma and Arslan, 2005) to enable each agent to both sample its
own best response behaviour and more effectively track changes to opponents’ behaviour.
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Algorithm 1 Neural Fictitious Self-Play (NFSP) with fitted Q-learning
Initialize game Γ and execute an agent via RUNAGENT for each player in the game
function RUNAGENT(Γ)
Initialize replay memoriesMRL (circular buffer) andMSL (reservoir)
Initialize average-policy network Π(s, a | θΠ) with random parameters θΠ
Initialize action-value network Q(s, a | θQ) with random parameters θQ
Initialize target network parameters θQ
′ ← θQ
Initialize anticipatory parameter η
for each episode do
Set policy σ ←
{
-greedy (Q) , with probability η
Π, with probability 1− η
Observe initial information state s1 and reward r1
for t = 1, T do
Sample action at from policy σ
Execute action at in game and observe reward rt+1 and next information state st+1
Store transition (st, at, rt+1, st+1) in reinforcement learning memoryMRL
if agent follows best response policy σ = -greedy (Q) then
Store behaviour tuple (st, at) in supervised learning memoryMSL
end if
Update θΠ with stochastic gradient descent on loss
L(θΠ) = E(s,a)∼MSL
[− log Π(s, a | θΠ)]
Update θQ with stochastic gradient descent on loss
L (θQ) = E(s,a,r,s′)∼MRL [(r + maxa′ Q(s′, a′ | θQ′)−Q(s, a | θQ))2]
Periodically update target network parameters θQ
′ ← θQ
end for
end for
end function
Fictitious play usually keeps track of the average of normal-form best response strategies that players
have chosen in the game, pˆiiT =
1
T
∑T
t=1 βˆ
i
t . Heinrich et al. (2015) propose to use sampling and
machine learning to generate data on and learn convex combinations of normal-form strategies in
extensive form according to equation (1). E.g. we can generate a set of extensive-form data of piiT
by sampling whole episodes of the game, using βit , t = 1, ... , T , in proportion to their weight,
1
T , in
the convex combination. NFSP agents use reservoir sampling (Vitter, 1985; Osborne et al., 2014)
to memorize experience of their historical best responses. The agent’s supervised learning memory,
MSL, is a reservoir to which it only adds experience when following its approximate best response
policy, β = -greedy(Q). An NFSP agent regularly trains its average policy network, Π(s, a | θΠ),
to match its average behaviour stored in its supervised learning memory, e.g. by optimizing the
log-probability of past actions taken.
If we want all agents to learn simultaneously while playing against each other, we face the fol-
lowing dilemma. In principle, each agent could play its average policy, pi, and learn a best
response with off-policy Q-learning, i.e. evaluate and maximize its action values, Qi(s, a) ≈
Eβi,pi−i
[
Git
∣∣St = s,At = a], of playing its best response policy βi against its fellow agents’ aver-
age strategy profile, pi−i. However, in this case the agent would not generate any experience of its
own best response behaviour, β, which is needed to train its average policy network, Π(s, a | θΠ), that
approximates the agent’s average of past best responses. To address this problem, we suggest using
an approximation of anticipatory dynamics of continuous-time dynamic fictitious play (Shamma
and Arslan, 2005). In this variant of fictitious play players choose best responses to a short-term
prediction of their opponents’ average normal-form strategies, pˆi−it + η
d
dt pˆi
−i
t , where η ∈ R is termed
the anticipatory parameter. The authors show that for appropriate, game-dependent choice of η
stability of fictitious play at equilibrium points can be improved. NFSP uses βˆit+1 − pˆiit ≈ ddt pˆiit as
a discrete-time approximation of the derivative that is used in these anticipatory dynamics. Note
that ∆pˆiit ∝ βˆit+1 − pˆiit is the normal-form update direction of common discrete-time fictitious play.
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NFSP agents choose their actions from the mixture policy σ ≡ (1− η)pˆi + ηβˆ. This enables each
agent to compute an approximate best response, βi, to its opponents’ anticipated average strategy
profile, σ−i ≡ pˆi−i + η(βˆ−i − pˆi−i), by iteratively evaluating and maximizing its action values,
Qi(s, a) ≈ Eβi,σ−i
[
Git
∣∣St = s,At = a]. Additionally, as each agent’s own best response policy
is now sampled in proportion to the anticipatory parameter, they can now train their average policy
networks from that experience.
4 Experiments
We evaluate NFSP and related algorithms in Leduc and Limit Texas Hold’em poker games. Most
of our experiments measure the exploitability of learned strategy profiles. In a two-player zero-sum
game, the exploitability of a strategy profile is defined as the expected average payoff that a best
response profile achieves against it. An exploitability of 2δ yields at least a δ-Nash equilibrium.
4.1 Leduc Hold’em
We empirically investigate the convergence of NFSP to Nash equilibria in Leduc Hold’em. We also
study whether removing or altering some of NFSP’s components breaks convergence.
One of our goals is to minimize reliance on prior knowledge. Therefore, we attempt to define a
domain-independent encoding of information states in poker games. Contrary to other work on
computer poker (Zinkevich et al., 2007; Gilpin et al., 2007; Johanson et al., 2013), we do not engineer
any higher-level features. Poker games usually consist of multiple rounds. At each round new cards
are revealed to the players. We represent each rounds’ cards by a k-of-n encoding. E.g. LHE has a
card deck of 52 cards and on the second round three cards are revealed. Thus, this round is encoded
with a vector of length 52 and three elements set to 1 and the rest to 0. In Limit Hold’em poker games,
players usually have three actions to choose from, namely {fold, call, raise}. Note that depending on
context, calls and raises can be referred to as checks and bets respectively. Betting is capped at a fixed
number of raises per round. Thus, we can represent the betting history as a tensor with 4 dimensions,
namely {player, round, number of raises, action taken}. E.g. heads-up LHE contains 2 players, 4
rounds, 0 to 4 raises per round and 3 actions. Thus we can represent a LHE betting history as a
2× 4× 5× 3 tensor. In a heads-up game we do not need to encode the fold action, as a two-player
game always ends if one player gives up. Thus, we can flatten the 4-dimensional tensor to a vector of
length 80. Concatenating with the card inputs of 4 rounds, we encode an information state of LHE as
a vector of length 288. Similarly, an information state of Leduc Hold’em can be encoded as a vector
of length 30, as it contains 6 cards with 3 duplicates, 2 rounds, 0 to 2 raises per round and 3 actions.
For learning in Leduc Hold’em, we manually calibrated NFSP for a fully connected neural network
with 1 hidden layer of 64 neurons and rectified linear activations. We then repeated the experiment for
various network architectures with the same parameters. In particular, we set the sizes of memories
to 200k and 2m forMRL andMSL respectively.MRL functioned as a circular buffer containing
a recent window of experience. MSL was updated with reservoir sampling (Vitter, 1985). The
reinforcement and supervised learning rates were set to 0.1 and 0.005, and both used vanilla Stochastic
Gradient Descent (SGD) without momentum for stochastic optimization of the neural networks. Each
agent performed 2 stochastic gradient updates of mini-batch size 128 per network for every 128 steps
in the game. The target network of the DQN algorithm was refitted every 300 updates. NFSP’s
anticipatory parameter was set to η = 0.1. The -greedy policies’ exploration started at 0.06 and
decayed to 0, proportionally to the inverse square root of the number of iterations.
Figure 1a shows NFSP approaching Nash equilibria for various network architectures. We observe a
monotonic performance increase with size of the networks. NFSP achieved an exploitability of 0.06,
which full-width XFP typically achieves after around 1000 full-width iterations.
In order to investigate the relevance of various components of NFSP, e.g. reservoir sampling and
anticipatory dynamics, we conducted an experiment that isolated their effects. Figure 1b shows that
these modifications led to decremental performance. In particular, using a fixed-size sliding window to
store experience of the agents’ own behaviour led to divergence. NFSP’s performance plateaued for a
high anticipatory parameter of 0.5, that most likely violates the game-dependent stability conditions of
dynamic fictitious play (Shamma and Arslan, 2005). Finally, using exponentially-averaged reservoir
sampling for supervised learning memory updates led to noisy performance.
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Figure 1: Learning performance of NFSP in Leduc Hold’em.
4.2 Comparison to DQN
Several stable algorithms have previously been proposed for deep reinforcement learning, notably
the DQN algorithm (Mnih et al., 2015). However, the empirical stability of these algorithms was
only previously established in single-agent, perfect (or near-perfect) information MDPs. Here, we
investigate the stability of DQN in multi-agent, imperfect-information games, in comparison to NFSP.
DQN learns a deterministic, greedy strategy. Such strategies are sufficient to behave optimally in
single-agent domains, i.e. MDPs for which DQN was designed. However, imperfect-information
games generally require stochastic strategies to achieve optimal behaviour. One might wonder if the
average behaviour of DQN converges to a Nash equilibrium. To test this, we augmented DQN with
a supervised learning memory and train a neural network to estimate its average strategy. Unlike
NFSP, the average strategy does not affect the agent’s behaviour in any way; it is passively observing
the DQN agent to estimate its evolution over time. We implement this variant of DQN by using
NFSP with an anticipatory parameter of η = 1. We trained DQN with all combinations of the
following parameters: Learning rate {0.2, 0.1, 0.05}, decaying exploration starting at {0.06, 0.12}
and reinforcement learning memory {2m reservoir, 2m sliding window}. Other parameters were
fixed to the same values as NFSP; note that these parameters only affect the passive observation
process. We then chose the best-performing result of DQN and compared to NFSP’s performance
that was achieved in the previous section’s experiment. DQN achieved its best-performing result with
a learning rate of 0.1, exploration starting at 0.12 and a sliding window memory of size 2m.
Figure 1c shows that DQN’s deterministic strategy is highly exploitable, which is expected as
imperfect-information games usually require stochastic policies. DQN’s average behaviour does not
approach a Nash equilibrium either. In principle, DQN also learns a best-response to the historical
experience generated by fellow agents. So why does it perform worse than NFSP? The problem is
that DQN agents exclusively generate self-play experience according to their -greedy strategies.
These experiences are both highly correlated over time, and highly focused on a narrow distribution
of states. In contrast, NFSP agents use an ever more slowly changing (anticipated) average policy to
generate self-play experience. Thus, their experience varies more smoothly, resulting in a more stable
data distribution, and therefore more stable neural networks. Note that this issue is not limited to
DQN; other common reinforcement learning methods have been shown to exhibit similarly stagnating
performance in poker games (Heinrich and Silver, 2015).
4.3 Limit Texas Hold’em
We applied NFSP to LHE, a game that is popular with humans. Since in 2008 a computer program
beat expert human LHE players for the first time in a public competition, modern computer agents
are widely considered to have achieved superhuman performance (Newall, 2013). The game was
essentially solved by Bowling et al. (2015). We evaluated our agents against the top 3 computer
programs of the most recent (2014) Annual Computer Poker Competition (ACPC) that featured LHE.
Learning performance was measured in milli-big-blinds won per hand, mbb/h, i.e. one thousandth of
a big blind that players post at the beginning of a hand.
We manually calibrated NFSP by trying 9 configurations. We achieved the best performance with
the following parameters. The neural networks were fully connected with four hidden layers of
1024, 512, 1024 and 512 neurons with rectified linear activations. The memory sizes were set to
6
-800
-700
-600
-500
-400
-300
-200
-100
 0
 100
 0  5e+06  1e+07  1.5e+07  2e+07  2.5e+07  3e+07  3.5e+07
m
bb
/h
Iterations
SmooCT
NFSP, best response strategy
NFSP, greedy-average strategy
NFSP, average strategy
(a) Win rates against SmooCT. The estimated stan-
dard error of each evaluation is less than 10 mbb/h.
Match-up Win rate (mbb/h)
escabeche -52.1 ± 8.5
SmooCT -17.4 ± 9.0
Hyperborean -13.6 ± 9.2
(b) Win rates of NFSP’s greedy-average strategy
against the top 3 agents of the ACPC 2014.
Figure 2: Performance of NFSP in Limit Texas Hold’em.
600k and 30m forMRL andMSL respectively.MRL functioned as a circular buffer containing a
recent window of experience. MSL was updated with exponentially-averaged reservoir sampling
(Osborne et al., 2014), replacing entries inMSL with minimum probability 0.25. We used vanilla
SGD without momentum for both reinforcement and supervised learning, with learning rates set to
0.1 and 0.01 respectively. Each agent performed 2 stochastic gradient updates of mini-batch size 256
per network for every 256 steps in the game. The target network was refitted every 1000 updates.
NFSP’s anticipatory parameter was set to η = 0.1. The -greedy policies’ exploration started at 0.08
and decayed to 0, more slowly than in Leduc Hold’em. In addition to NFSP’s main, average strategy
profile we also evaluated the best response and greedy-average strategies, which deterministically
choose actions that maximize the predicted action values or probabilities respectively.
To provide some intuition for win rates in heads-up LHE, a player that always folds will lose 750
mbb/h, and expert human players typically achieve expected win rates of 40-60 mbb/h at online
high-stakes games. Similarly, the top half of computer agents in the ACPC 2014 achieved up to 50
mbb/h between themselves. While training, we periodically evaluated NFSP’s performance against
SmooCT from symmetric play for 25000 hands each. Figure 2a presents the learning performance of
NFSP. NFSP’s average and greedy-average strategy profiles exhibit a stable and relatively monotonic
performance improvement, and achieve win rates of around -50 and -20 mbb/h respectively. The
best response strategy profile exhibited more noisy performance, mostly ranging between -50 and 0
mbb/h. We also evaluated the final greedy-average strategy against the other top 3 competitors of
the ACPC 2014. Table 2b presents the results. NFSP achieves winrates similar to those of the top
half of computer agents in the ACPC 2014 and thus is competitive with superhuman computer poker
programs.
4.4 Approximations to fictitious play
NFSP approximates fictitious play, both by using a neural network function approximator to represent
strategies, and by averaging those strategies via gradient descent machine learning. In the appendix
we provide experiments that illustrate the effect of these two approximations, compared to exact
representations of strategies and perfect averaging procedures.
5 Related work
Reliance on human expert knowledge can be expensive, prone to human biases and limiting if such
knowledge is suboptimal. Yet many methods that have been applied to games have relied on human
expert knowledge. Deep Blue used a human-engineered evaluation function for chess (Campbell et al.,
2002). In computer Go, Maddison et al. (2015) and Clark and Storkey (2015) trained deep neural
networks from data of expert human play. In computer poker, current game-theoretic approaches
use heuristics of card strength to abstract the game to a tractable size (Zinkevich et al., 2007; Gilpin
et al., 2007; Johanson et al., 2013). Waugh et al. (2015) recently combined one of these methods
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with function approximation. However, their full-width algorithm has to implicitly reason about all
information states at each iteration, which is prohibitively expensive in large domains. In contrast,
NFSP focuses on the sample-based reinforcement learning setting where the game’s states need not
be exhaustively enumerated and the learner may not even have a model of the game’s dynamics.
Nash equilibria are the only strategy profiles that rational agents can hope to converge on in self-
play (Bowling and Veloso, 2001). TD-Gammon (Tesauro, 1995) is a world-class backgammon
agent, whose main component is a neural network trained from self-play reinforcement learning.
While its algorithm, based on temporal-difference learning, is sound in two-player zero-sum perfect-
information games, it does not generally converge in games with imperfect information. DQN
(Mnih et al., 2015) combines temporal-difference learning with experience replay and deep neural
network function approximation. It achieved human-level performance in a majority of Atari games,
learning from raw sensory inputs. However, these Atari games were set up as single-agent domains
with potential opponents fixed and controlled by the Atari emulator. Our experiments showed that
DQN agents were unable to approach a Nash equilibrium in Leduc Hold’em, where players were
allowed to adapt dynamically. Yakovenko et al. (2016) trained deep neural networks in self-play in
computer poker, including two poker games that are popular with humans. Their networks performed
strongly against heuristic-based and simple computer programs. Expert human players were able
to outperform their agent, albeit over a statistically insignificant sample size. It remains to be seen
whether their approach converges in practice or theory.
In this work, we focused on imperfect-information two-player zero-sum games. Fictitious play,
however, is also guaranteed to converge to Nash equilibria in cooperative, potential games (Monderer
and Shapley, 1996). It is therefore conceivable that NFSP can be successfully applied to these
games as well. Furthermore, recent developments in continuous-action reinforcement learning
(Lillicrap et al., 2015) could enable NFSP to be applied to continuous-action games, which current
game-theoretic methods cannot deal with directly.
6 Conclusion
We have introduced NFSP, the first end-to-end deep reinforcement learning approach to learning
approximate Nash equilibria of imperfect-information games from self-play. Unlike previous game-
theoretic methods, NFSP is scalable without prior domain knowledge. Furthermore, NFSP is the first
deep reinforcement learning method known to converge to approximate Nash equilibria in self-play.
Our experiments have shown NFSP to converge reliably to approximate Nash equilibria in a small
poker game, whereas DQN’s greedy and average strategies did not. NFSP learned a strategy that
is competitive with superhuman programs in a real-world scale imperfect-information game from
scratch without using explicit prior knowledge.
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A Robustness of XFP
To understand how function approximation interacts with FSP, we conducted some simple exper-
iments that emulate approximation and sampling errors in the full-width algorithm XFP. Firstly,
we explore what happens when the perfect averaging used in XFP is replaced by an incremental
averaging process closer to gradient descent. Secondly, we explore what happens when the exact
table lookup used in XFP is replaced by an approximation with epsilon error.
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Figure 3: Full-width XFP performance with added noise
Figure 3a shows the performance of XFP with default, 1/T , and constant stepsizes for its strategy
updates. We see improved asymptotic but lower initial performance for smaller stepsizes. For
constant stepsizes the performance seems to plateau rather than diverge. With reservoir sampling we
can achieve an effective stepsize of 1/T . However, the results suggest that exponentially-averaged
reservoir sampling can be a viable choice too, as exponential averaging of past memories would
approximately correspond to using a constant stepsize.
XFP with stepsize 1 is equivalent to a full-width iterated best response algorithm. While this algorithm
converges to a Nash equilibrium in finite perfect-information two-player zero-sum games, the results
suggest that with imperfect information this is not generally the case. The Poker-CNN algorithm
introduced by Yakovenko et al. (2016) stores a small number of past strategies which it iteratively
computes new strategies against. Replacing strategies in that set is similar to updating an average
strategy with a large stepsize. This might lead to similar problems as shown in Figure 3a.
Our NFSP agents add random exploration to their policies and use noisy stochastic gradient updates
to learn action values, which determine their approximate best responses. Therefore, we investigated
the impact of random noise added to the best response computation, which XFP performs by dynamic
programming. At each backward induction step, we pass back a uniform-random action’s value
with probability  and the best action’s value otherwise. Figure 3b shows monotonically decreasing
performance with added noise. However, performance remains stable and keeps improving for all
noise levels.
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